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ABSTRACT
The problem of providing security for ground
lines of communications in the counterinsurgency environ-
ment is examined. Several types of forces and modes of
employment are considered and analyzed in order to deter-
mine their feasibility and desirability. Recommendations
are made for resource allocation in areas which have
different insurgent threat levels. Some economic and
political factors which affect route security are mentioned
A comparison, using Lanchester's equations, is
made of the reaction and escort modes of employment for
infantry forces providing security to a truck convoy.
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The following quote is included as a reminder that
this type of study has value only if it can help those in
the field gain some more insight to the problem of providing
route security.
"If ever there was a world in which situations
do not repeat themselves like some mass production
model, it is the military world. If we are to
avoid the imposition of arbitrary limits to the
exercise of judgment and control, let us be care-
ful not to create in a mathematical vacuum sit-
uations which are based neither on past experience
of affairs, nor on any conception of the innumerable
variables and factors that determine social decision
either today or tomorrow. The human brain, human
values, human judgments, are still superior to the
mechanics and processes of electronic computers or
guidance systems. The day this ceases to be true
there will probably be no human brains. But until
then, let us use true scientific method as an aid
to human judgment, and not as a hindrance. Science
is human experience; it is not an alternative to
judgments, and it is certainly not something that
can operate outside human experience." [14]
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The ability to move freely in a hostile environment
has been a goal of soldiers since the first military units
took to the field many years ago. Attempts to achieve this
ability for unhampered movement have traditionally tied down
a large portion of any field army. Route security is even
more difficult in the counterinsurgency environment due to
the wide separation of units and the lack of well defined
combat areas. The insurgent may attack friendly lines of
communication (LOC's) to gain a psychological victory, to
train his forces, to capture supplies, to slow the movement
of friendly supplies and troop units or to destroy the
moving elements.
The Greco-Persian War, which occurred almost five
hundred years before Christ, provides an example of where
the failure to provide proper security forces led to the
T91loss of the campaign by the Persians. In more recent
times route security problems have had serious consequences
for military units in the field. The French were unable to
move in large portions of Viet Nam during their Indochina
War and the Free World forces presently face a similar
problem in the same area.
It would seem that a problem as persistent as route
security could be viewed as a phenomenon which has certain
existing variables regardless of the time frame and that
these variables can be identified.
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and relate,
in both a qualitative and quantitative way, those variables
which have always been a part of the route security problem.
At first glance three areas of interest appear. These are:
(1) the environment, (2) the moving elements and (3) the
security forces. See Figure 1 for a graphic portrayal of
these three general areas. Each of these will be discussed
in a separate chapter and it will be shown that when decisions
are made affecting route security operations all of these
three areas should be considered together.
Chapters II and III contain the discussion of the en-
vironment and the moving elements respectively. Chapter IV
is a discussion of the security forces and their possible
modes of employment. A synthesis is made in Chapter V and
the various forces are examined in the light of the environ-
mental and moving element factors. Chapter VI is an analysis
of escort and reaction forces based on Lanchester's equations.
Chapter VII contains the conclusions and recommendations.
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FIGURE 1





Environmental factors which are related to the composi-
tion, employment and effectiveness of route security forces
are the weather, the routes themselves and the threat posed
by the insurgent. Each of these items plays a role in the
environmental scene and although there is likely to be inter-
action among them they can be discussed separately.
A. WEATHER
Periods of reduced visibility such as rain, fog and
snow can restrict the methods of movement available to the
security forces as well as hampering the supporting air,
artillery and naval gun fire. Normal expectations would
predict a decreased efficiency in detection and intrusion
devices in inclement weather. Therefore, any security force
structure should be made responsive to climatic fluctuations
Variations in the weather will also alter the movement
speeds of supply elements which may change their vulner-
ability to enemy action.
B. THE ROUTES
The routes over which the counterinsurgent may move are
in the air, on roads or railroads and on rivers. Concep-
tually the security problem in all these cases is the same
but the primary emphasis in this paper will be placed on
movement by road rather than air, rail or river. Clausewitz
in his book ON WAR
, said of roads,
"The value of these roads depends on their length,
their number, their situation, that is their
general direction and their direction close to
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the army, their quality as roads, difficulties
of ground, the political relations and feelings
of the local population, and lastly, on the
protection they derive from fortresses or natural
obstacles of the country." 1
In areas where counterinsurgent operations may take
place in the future it is unlikely that sophisticated trans-
portation networks will exist. This fact limits the alter-
nate routes that may be available in the event of enemy
interdiction. The routes should be studied carefully to
ascertain the political and economic implications of their
use. In some areas the local economy will require consider-
able civilian traffic on roads which in many cases helps to
reduce the frequency of insurgent initiated incidents. It
is difficult to mine a heavily traveled road and the alien-
ation of the local populace may not be a profitable move for
the insurgent. Since villagers who live abreast a particular
route can be of great benefit in reducing the hazard to
friendly movements this aspect must be studied closely.
It may be less costly to route supply movements through the
more friendly areas even though some extra mileage is
involved.
Some excellent work has been done by the RAND Corporation
on interdiction models and although primarily designed for
the planning of air interdiction against the enemy they are
applicable here. [6] [10] [19]. The number of likely ambush
points and bridges could be plotted and used as a restraint
to movement in a network analysis. Using longer routes with
Clausewitz, Karl Von, On War
,
(Washington, D.C.:
Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 304.
13
lower attack probabilities could, in many instances, reduce
the security forces required for protection. For instance,
in the simplified network shown in Figure 2 there are two
alternative routes which could be used. Route 1-2-6 is a
three hour trip but has two likely ambush points and two
bridges which are vulnerable to enemy action. If the bridges
were blown a considerable engineering effort would be re-
quired for passage and the prospect of ambush would be pro-
vided for. Route 1-3-4-5-6 is a four hour trip but there
is only one bridge on the route and no areas considered to
be likely ambush points. The security forces required to
protect a moving element on route 1-3-4-5-6 would most
likely be less than those on route 1-2-6. If the additional
hour of travel time is not a critical factor then it is
clear that route 1-3-4-5-6 would be a better choice from
the standpoint of security force requirements.
Engineer and intelligence units often analyze road net-
works in order to determine traffic capacities, maintenance
requirements and tonnage limits for bridges. It may be
advantageous to evaluate roads from a security standpoint
in order to determine the expected security forces that
might be required.
The routes to be secured will probably traverse many
types of terrain and this has its security implications also.
When helicopters are used to transport reaction forces the
availability of landing zones is important. In the desert
there will be few ambush sites along the route and heli-

































reaction forces can be provided an insurgent would require
a method of high speed transport to insure his escape due to
the good visibility afforded counterinsurgent aircraft. It
is unlikely that large insurgent forces could be moved any
appreciable distance, without being observed, in a desert
environment. In jungle areas it can be expected that few
clear helicopter landing sites will be available which could
limit the effectiveness of air mobile reaction forces.
Close cover for ambush sites will be abundant and the insurg-
ent can be expected to be able to move large numbers of men
without being detected.
Some routes will gain a certain degree of protection
from their location and from man-made features in the immed-
iate vicinity. A moving element traveling on a road which
is flanked by a river is provided some protection on one
shoulder due to the difficulty the insurgent faces in mount-
ing an attack from the river side of the road. Defoliation
of roadside vegetation provides an excellent field of fire
for escorting security forces and makes it difficult for the
insurgent to achieve the accurate close range fire required
for an effective ambush. It may also be possible to use
artillery to a greater advantage in defoliated areas due to
the separation between the moving element and the attacker.
Roads which are used for civilian commerce may not be profit-
able targets for the insurgent because of the possible loss
of goodwill within the population dependent on the use of the
road. Insurgents have depended on road traffic taxes for
income in the past and this may deter them from destroying
16
or rendering impassable routes used for civilian travel.
The armed forces can often shift to a method of air or sea
resupply if a route cannot be used, thus the only effect of
destroying the route turns out to be a loss of income for
the insurgent.
C. THE ENEMY
The primary hazard to friendly movement in an area is
the enemy's capability to interdict the lines of communication
It is desirable to have a classification system for the var-
ious roads so that a security force can be provided which is
capable of countering the expected enemy force. Both enemy
capabilities and intentions should be considered in such a
classification system in order to account for the areas
where the insurgent has large units but for some reason has
decided not to employ them.
In the insurgency environment it can be safely assumed
that the insurgent has the capability and to some degree the
intention to interdict movement with isolated mines, grenades
or snipers at almost any time. The knowledge that attacks
on moving elements may cause the counterinsurgent to deploy
large forces in a given area might deter the enemy even
though he has a large force in the vicinity. If he is re-
grouping or training it is unlikely that he would invite
retaliation by counterinsurgent forces. Insurgent object-
ives will certainly vary from time to time and may include
attacking a convoy to slow down movement of friendly supplies,
to kill troops, to resupply his own forces, train his sol-
diers or merely to harass counterinsurgent units and gain
17
some psychological advantage.
A classification system has been chosen which is based
primarily on the degree of insurgent control in a given area.
A method of color coding similar to the one used by the
Marine Corps has been used to characterize areas with differ-
2
ent levels of insurgent threat. This system is easy to
implement and provides a good verbal and graphic indication
of the relative hazard to movement along a given route.
(See Figures 3 and 4) Value judgments, visceral impulse,
military judgment on quantitative values such as incident
rate can be used in the hazard classification of a road
network. Green, yellow and red are the colors used and the
following is a general description of the expected environ-
ment corresponding to the various colors.
D. GREEN ROADS
The enemy maintains his capability to cause isolated
incidents which probably involve only one or two vehicles
on green roads. These areas are controlled by the counter-
insurgent and will include such sites as major cities,
logistic support areas and major headquarters areas. Travel
by friendly personnel is generally unrestricted. The types
of incidents to be expected are snipers, grenades and
occasional mines.
E. YELLOW ROADS
Yellow roads are those roads over which the counter-
insurgent has a predominance of control but where small














ROAD CLASSIFICATION USING DEGREE
OF INSURGENT CONTROL AS A CRITERIA
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insurgent units may attack at almost any time. Rarely will
the insurgent have the strength to stay and fight. These
areas will include roads between nearby friendly instal-
lations, outskirts of major cities, and some main supply
routes. Single vehicles will in all probability be prohibited
from traveling on yellow roads.
F. RED ROADS
Red roads are considered to be in the combat area and
here the insurgent has the capability of attacking in
strengths up to and including a battalion. Military doctrine
will normally require convoys for all military traffic on
[17]
red roads . The enemy may ambush convoys for a variety
of reasons and will have the capability of staying to fight
and overrunning unprotected moving elements.
The classification system must be flexible and respon-
sive to change in the tactical situation or degree of paci-
fication that may exist along certain routes. It is not
necessary that a particular route be entirely one color or
that it remain so for long periods of time. For example,
the operations of friendly or insurgent tactical units may
change the classifications as shown in Figure 4
.
The friendly battalions which are operating on the
route sectors A-B , C-D, and F-G may have the strength to
effectively reduce those areas from red to yellow. While
they are in the area it may be possible to reduce the
security forces allotted to those sectors. Conversely, an
insurgent operation along the route A-E might change its





































of hazard presented. A responsive route security system
should be able to adjust to this type of change in order to
effectively allocate the available security resources.
Thus far it has been shown that the weather, the
routes and the enemy can affect a route security operation.
A system of route classification has been chosen but it is
now necessary to examine the moving elements to determine




The primary reason for providing security for ground
lines of communications is that the counterinsurgent would
like to move at will along these lines. The reasons for
movement in a counterinsurgency environment are many and
the urgency requirements for each type of movement may vary
considerably. The types of movement may be classified as
civil, tactical or logistic; each of which will be discus-
sed separately. A moving element will be considered to be
any unit that is proceeding along a road be it a single
truck or a convoy.
A. CIVIL MOVEMENTS
Civilian traffic, both intervillage and intracity will
probably be greater than might be expected in a conventional
war. The government should be able to provide security for
civilian travel in order to convince the populace that the
insurgent does not control the area. If the farm to market
roads cannot be protected then the people will be forced to
trade with the insurgent. Road taxes have been levied by
the insurgent in Viet Nam and may be seen again in the
future. Since road taxes may be a source of income for the
insurgent it can be supposed that he will not try to cut the
flow of traffic entirely but may continually harass move-
ment in order to show his control. Most civil traffic will
be found on green and yellow roads and normally the effect
of reasonable delays will not be of major consequence. Be-
cause of the effect on the people, consideration should be
23
given to the political and economic implications of making
certain routes secure enough for civil traffic to move at
will and without having to pay a road tax.
B. TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
Military units involved in a tactical move will probably
traverse green, yellow and red roads. It is assumed that
these units will provide their own security with forces
available within their organization. Typical of this type
of movement will be heavily armed convoys and an effective
system of command and control that can call upon assistance
rapidly from a higher headquarters in the tactical chain of
command. Delays in this type of movement may have serious
consequences and therefore the necessary resources to insure
a successful and timely move are usually made available.
C. LOGISTIC MOVEMENTS
It is the logistic moves which are most important to
route security planners since these are usually made by
major supply commands that do not have security resources
directly available to them. Items moved may vary from cri-
tically needed ammunition to commodities for the PX. It
has been stated, as a principle of moving military supplies,
that in peace time the criteria is the least expensive
transport mode and that in combat the major consideration
3is the timely delivery of required commodities. But, what
is "timely"? How much does it cost in terms of the available
3Research Analysis Corporation; Computer Simulation
of a Theater Transportation System: A Feasibility Study
,




resources to make this "timely" delivery? It appears that
conceptually the idea of the least expensive mode of
transport has importance even in combat. For example,
assume that the number of vehicles required varies inversely
with the time available to complete the movement and repre-
sent this relationship by a curve as shown in Figure 5. A
sample set of data which is shown in Table I. was used in
this example.
TABLE I
Number of trucks and time required
for movement of 140 tons using trucks














TIME AVAILABLE. FOR MOVEMENT
FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF TRUCKS VS. TIME REQUIRED
FOR MOVEMENT OF 14 TONS USING
TRUCKS WITH A TWO TON CAPACITY
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Several things are implied in Figure 5. First, that
the trucks move at the same speed and travel over the same
route. Secondly, a round trip to and from the point of
delivery takes one day so that a five day movement requires
one-fifth as many trucks on any given day as is required
for a one day movement. It can be seen that any point in
the unshaded region is a feasible combination but only those
points which lie on the curve are efficient. By this, it is
meant that 140 tons could be moved in the unshaded region
but some trucks would be empty or only partially loaded
whereas the combinations on the curve all use the full truck
capacity.
The security implications of the different combinations
must also be considered. Depending upon the type and number
of security forces available it may be more efficient to
provide protection for the seventy-truck movement on a
single day than it would be to provide protection to seven
successive ten-truck movements.
If a constant size convoy is used but the percent of
vehicles used to carry security forces is varied it can be
seen that the flow of goods in a given period of time will
decrease as the percentage of vehicles used for security
forces is increased. For instance, a twenty-five vehicle
convoy made up of three-ton capacity trucks could carry
seventy-five tons if none were used for security forces.
If ten trucks were used to transport security forces the
payload would be reduced to forty-five tons. An increase
in the percentage of vehicles employed for security forces
27
would also increase the probability of defeating an ambush
due to the increased strength available. This may occur as











% of vehicles carrying security forces
FIGURE 6 4
Tradeoff Between Cargo Moved and Security
for Security Forces of Sizes
If the primary objective is to maintain a high tons-
moved figure and a lower, but acceptable, ability to defeat
an ambush with escort forces then perhaps point A may be
chosen in Figure 6. The concept here is that if one can
afford the lesser probability of defeating an ambush then
more tons of cargo can be transported by a fixed size convoy
Operations in the left hand portion of Figure 6 would
probably be acceptable on all green and some yellow roads.
4Deitchman, Seymour J. , "Applications of Operations
Research to Internal War", Army OR Symposium, Proceedings
,





If the requirement to defeat the ambush is the overriding
consideration then points in the vicinity of B may be chosen
Operations using the mix indicated by point B are probable
on red roads . An example might be a show of force operation
where the tons of goods moved is of secondary importance.
A similar diagram can be drawn for the size of the
convoy. As convoy size is increased the probability of
defeating an ambush is increased due to the larger number
of troops available to counteract any enemy action. This
implies a fixed percentage of vehicles used for security
forces. It is not intuitively obvious why the tons-moved
in a given period of time is less with larger convoys but
an example may clarify this point. If some given number of
trucks are to be routed to a particular destination, and a
fixed loading time exists for each vehicle and a limited
number of loading crews are assigned then there will be
less slack time in dispatching vehicles in a smaller convoy.
For instance, given 100 trucks, a 10 minute load time and
10 loading crews; ten-truck convoys could be dispatched
every 10 minutes. A one hundred truck convoy could not be
dispatched for 100 minutes. Combined with the fact that
larger convoys require more control personnel and generally
travel at slower speeds than smaller convoys it seems clear
that the tons moved in a given period of time decreases
with an increase in convoy size. If the curves are similar
to those shown in Figure 7, then point A might be chosen
when the goal is to maintain a continuous flow of goods
with a high buildup rate while accepting a relatively low
29
ability to defeat an ambush with escorting forces. Points
in the vicinity of B, which imply large convoys, may be
chosen when the requirement to defeat the attacker takes











Tradeoff Between Cargo Moved and Security
for Convoys of Various Sizes
shown in Figures 6 and 7 will have to be determined empiri-
cally and troop tests could provide the necessary data for
planning purposes.
The moving elements have been examined and now the






Of primary interest in this chapter is the force
structure available to provide security to the route and its
possible methods of employment. In Chapter V the relative
merits of the alternative force/employment modes that are
generated will be analyzed in the light of different environ-
ments and moving element considerations.
The first element of the security forces which are
available are the normal military units, both allied and







These units can seek out and destroy insurgent elements,
provide increased mobility to the moving elements , sur-
veillance of the routes, close air support and logistic
support to other counterinsurgency units. Military units
are normally armed with a large variety of weapons and are
capable of moving over almost any type of terrain. They
have effective command and control procedures and are
usually well trained.
c
The engineers can repair roads and bridges or build
bypasses and the protection given by the combat arms may
allow the moving elements to move faster than would other-
wise be possible.
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Also available are the police forces of the country
involved in a counterinsurgency effort. The police can be
used to direct traffic, set up check points and aid in the
intelligence collection effort. They may also be used to
patrol routes and outpost areas , such as bridges , requiring
additional security. Military police units can also be
used for the above tasks.
The paramilitary forces available will depend to a
large degree upon the amount of preparation that has been
made by the counterinsurgents . These units may include a
variety of preparation states; from unpaid, non-uniformed
local inhabitants to uniformed paid volunteers who are well
armed and trained. They can be utilized to provide security
for installations in their local area but they have a limited
offensive capability. Paramilitary forces may also be used
to maintain surveillance, protect the local populace and
support the counterinsurgent effort in their own villages.
The modes of employment for these forces in route







There are possibly more ways in which to employ these
forces but in concept these four modes cover the readily










FOUR POSSIBLE MODES OF EMPLOYMENT
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A. ESCORT MODE OF EMPLOYMENT
Units employed in the escort mode will be considered
to be actually traveling with the moving elements. Ground
and aviation units can be employed in the escort mode. This
method of employment offers an immediate reaction to enemy
attack but requires large numbers of troops to provide an
escort for every moving element.
The drivers of individual vehicles, if armed, can be
considered to be a light escort. Armed assistant drivers
can also be used to advantage in some areas.
Consideration should be given to the location within
a convoy of units employed in an escort mode. The units
should be dispersed throughout the convoy in order to pro-
vide protection for the entire convoy. Armored vehicles
can be employed in the escort mode and provide the convoy
commander with a ready source of firepower in the event the
convoy is attacked.
Automatic weapons and weapons with large single shot
areas of effectiveness will probably be best suited for use
by troops employed in the escort mode. The one big dis-
advantage of this type of protection is that a large amount
of resources are tied down and if the probability of attack
is low in a given area this may be an expensive luxury.
B. REACTION MODE OF EMPLOYMENT
Employment in the reaction mode implies that the
security force is not physically present but can arrive at
the scene of conflict promptly. The reaction time is a
function of distance, speed of travel, readiness and
34
availability. The size of the reaction force may be a
function of enemy strength. Referring to Figure 9 it can
be seen that a moving element which has been stopped at
point C could be supported by reaction forces departing
from either A or B.
A method which could be used to estimate the expected




T = C + ED + g .60 + DE (IV. I)
Where: T = Reaction time (minutes). Reaction
time shall be considered to be that
time which elapses between the real-
ization that a reaction force is re-
quired and the time that the reaction
force is deployed against the enemy.
C = Communications delays (minutes)
.
Includes such things as indigenous
government approval of airstrikes, etc.
ED = Embarkation-deployment time (minutes)
.
This would be an average time, based on
experience, for the forces to load,
unload and engage the enemy.
M = Distance to the ambush site (miles)
.
S = Speed of movement for the reaction
forces (mph) . For example, 30 mph for
truckborne forces and 60 mph for
heliborne forces.
DE = Delays enroute due to enemy action
(minutes) . This is a random variable
and planners could use an expected
value. Helicopters may be delayed due
to hostile fire or insecure landing zones
in the objective area. Motorized relief



































































For instance, equation IV. 1 might be used in the follow-
ing way. Given the forces shown in table II a decision must
be made as to which force to commit to provide relief for a
convoy stopped at point C in Figure 9.
TABLE II
Data for example of reaction time computation

























For the heliborne force we have:
T = 10 + 30 + J-i .60 + 10 = 84 (IV. 2)60
For the truckborne force we have
T = 10 + 15 + ii .60 + 20 = 73 (IV. 3)
The times and speeds shown in Table II may not be
realistic but in concept the decision could be made using
this method. In the simple example given previously the
truckborne force was indicated as providing a faster
reaction time. If everything else remained constant ex-
cept the point at which the moving element was attacked
then it is possible to determine at what distance from A
it would be more expedient to commit the heliborne force.
Let X = Distance from A in miles
Now, to find the point at which the reaction times
are equal we solve the following equation:
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10 + 15 + X_;_60 + 20 = 10 + 30 + (48-X) 60 +10
30 60 (IV.4)
T (truckborne) = T (heliborne
which gives X = 17.66 miles.
Hence, one could say that when the convoy is more than
eighteen miles from A the heliborne force provides a quicker
reaction time. By studying the various road nets in this
way prior to actual attack on convoys a commander respon-
sible for route security could have available some pre-
determined decision rules with which to operate.
Reaction forces can aid an attacked unit in two ways.
First they can, upon arrival, support the moving element by
attacking the insurgent. Secondly, the knowledge on the
part of the insurgent that reaction forces may arrive soon
might cause him to break contact earlier than he would if
he knew no reaction forces were available.
C. STATIC MODE OF EMPLOYMENT
Route security forces can also be employed in a static
mode by deploying units along dangerous routs or building
a line of fortified positions. Units which occupy fortified
positions must have sufficient strength not only to carry
out route security missions but also to prevent the position
from being overrun by the insurgent. It has been found in
the past that units of at least platoon strength are required
so that the individual soldier feels secure enough himself
7to be effective.
7Special Operations Research Office; A Study of Rear
Area Security Measures
, SORO/CINCFAC/0090/65 , (Washington,
D.C.: SORO, July 1965), p. 19.
If forces are not available to occupy all the fortified
positions with the required strength then they can be manned
on a random basis. If, for example, there were ten positions
and personnel available to occupy only six of them, then a
different set of six positions could be occupied each day.
D. PATROL MODE OF EMPLOYMENT
The patrol mode offers the counterinsurgent an offen-
sive as well as a defensive tool for route security missions.
Motorized patrols can move along the routes and may trigger
some ambushes so that logistic convoys can move with reduced
security forces. A patrol with a hidden offensive capabil-
ity, in the form of a high speed reaction force, could be
sent out in an attempt to invite attack. This is similar
in concept to the World War II use by the Germans of
ships. Helicopters could be used to transport patrolling
ground forces and can cover large areas by choosing patrol
routes on a random basis.
For example consider the situation depicted in Figure
10. The landing zones are numbered and each helicopter is
assigned a sequence of three randomly chosen numbers which
should eliminate any predictable pattern for the patrol
effort. Each of the three different types of lines in
Figure 10 represent the patrol path of a helicopterborne
force. At each landing zone the troops disembark and pro-
ceed on a normal foot patrol. They then reload and proceed
to the next assigned landing zone. This method would make
it somewhat difficult for the insurgent to move in the area












































in the immediate vicinity. This same technique could
probably be utilized by police squad cars or regular foot
patrols
.
E. FORCE/EMPLOYMENT MODE COMBINATIONS
The intelligence collection effort of the counter-
insurgent force will probably include those items of interest
to the route security forces and this will probably make the
requirement for a separate intelligence capability unneces-
sary. Communications are vital and agencies controlling
route security forces should receive all pertinent intel-
ligence information as quickly as possible.
One tool which can provide on the spot intelligence of
immense value to a moving element is the helicopter employed
in the escort mode. Information concerning blown bridges,
route obstructions and likely ambush sites can be relayed
to the convoy commander immediately so that appropriate
action may be taken.
Route security planners must make decisions on the
employment of the engineer units with the primary question
being whether or not to employ them in the escort mode.
Engineer units help to maintain the momentum of the moving
elements but are usually in great demand in the counter-
insurgency environment due to their contribution to the
civic action and nation building programs.
In areas where bypasses can be rapidly built to replace
blown bridges, it may prove profitable to employ engineers
in the escort mode so that moving elements will not be
slowed and therefore more readily subject to attack. Where
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the repair effort to the road requires a longer time period
it may prove more profitable to have the engineers employed
in a reaction mode. Some combat engineer units will prob-
ably be deployed with their parent commands in the static
mode but this will be relatively rare. Engineer units are
in general unsatisfactory for employment in the patrol mode
because they are nonproductive for long periods of time.
POLICE/ESCORT ; Police can be used in
the escort mode but are usually lightly
armed and incapable of fighting a de-
termined attacker. Some special police
units such as border patrol police may
be better suited for employment in the
escort mode because of their heavier
weapons
.
POLICE/STATIC : This is the most normal
employment of police units and it is
hoped that their presence will be a
deterrent to small scale incidents by
the insurgents.
POLICE/REACTION : Police units can pro-
vide a reaction force but again their
weapons and training are not usually
suited for fighting a determined attacker.
Because of their reliance upon bicycles
and motorcycles for transportation and
the fact that many police must move on
foot it can be seen from equation IV.
1
that their reaction time will probably
be extremely slow. Military police
units can provide a considerably more
effective reaction force than regular
police units and may even have such
vehicles as armored cars to use for
rapid transit.
POLICE/PATROL ; Patrols by police units,
both foot and motorized, can be effective
in making movement by the insurgent more
difficult and could aid in the intel-
ligence collection effort.
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PARAMILITARY/ESCORT : Because of the local
orientation of most paramilitary forces
they can be used in the escort mode but
should probably be used only over short
distances. Their knowledge of the local
area may prove invaluable in spotting
ambush sites.
PARAMILITARY/STATIC : This will probably be
the most likely employment of paramilitary
forces and would include the guarding of
bridges and other local installations.
PARAMILITARY/REACTION : A reaction force
can be provided but unless external trans-
portation can be provided the timeliness
will be very poor due to the requirement
to move by foot.
PARAMILITARY/PATROL : Extensive patrols
can be conducted by paramilitary units
and their knowledge of the local terrain
may make it possible for them to ascertain
when the insurgent has been operating in
the area.
INFANTRY/ESCORT : Infantry units are
effective in the escort mode but require
transportation with similar speed charac-
teristics of the moving elements. This
increases the size of the convoy and if
the moving element is not attacked the
escorting troops and trucks are unproduc-
tive. There is however, a good possibility
that some deterrent effect on the insurgent
is provided by the presence of the
infantry escort.
INFANTRY/STATIC : Infantry employed in
the static mode requires large numbers
of troops to be effective and unless
positions are occupied in strength
there is the danger of them being over-
run singly by the insurgents.
INFANTRY/REACTION ; Infantry is well
suited to this mode and the means of
transportation may be foot, motor
transport or helicopter. This will




INFANTRY/PATROL : All types of patrols
can be conducted effectively by infan-
try units and this provides an offensive
use for infantry units in route security
missions
.
ARTILLERY/ESCORT, STATIC, PATROL ;
These combinations are generally not
applicable
.
ARTILLERY/REACTION : Artillery units
are actually a form of reaction force
with respect to the moving element no
matter how it is employed. Its long
range gives artillery a good standoff
distance and reduces its vulnerability
to enemy action. If artillery is heli-
lifted to the ambush area as a part of
a mobile reaction force its effect is
the same as if it were firing on call
from a more secure position.
ARMOR/ESCORT : Armor units which shall
be considered to include tanks, armored
cars and armored personnel carriers can
be effectively used in the escort mode.
Armor has the advantage of being able to
move in the killing zone of an ambush
and can attack the insurgent when the
infantry is pinned down. The off-road
travel capabilities of armor units may
also be useful in some instances.
ARMOR/STATIC : Armor units could be
employed in the static mode but this
is usually a last resort if there are
no alternative uses which can capital-
ize on their inherent capabilities.
ARMOR/REACT ION : The reaction speed will
probably be greater than that of motor
transport and certainly less vulnerable
to enemy action but slower than air
mobile units.
ARMOR/PATROL : This may be the most
effective employment of armor units due
to their relative invulnerability to
enemy action and the possibility of
flushing out enemy ambushing forces.
Routes can be patrolled by armor units
and if contact is made they most
likely will be able to stand off the




AIR/ESCORT ; This combination provides
a timely, powerful force to the moving
element which can be used for intelligence,
communications or immediate firepower.
Air resources however, will usually be
in great demand and it is unlikely that
the priority assigned to the security of
moving elements can compete with that
assigned to bombing and close air support
missions by fixed wing aircraft. Heli-
copters may be used in this mode for
elements moving in particularly
hazardous areas or with especially
important cargoes.
AIR/STATIC, PATROL ; This combination
is generally not applicable.
AIR/REACTION ; This is probably the
most reasonable use of air resources in
the counterinsurgency environment where
there is a low likelihood of an enemy
air threat. There are three probable
ways in which air resources can provide
a reaction force. Ground alert - in
varying degrees of readiness pilots
and planes are in a standby status on
the ground. Reaction time will include
alert time, travel time and communi-
cations delays. Airborne alert - Air-
craft are airborne and can be sent almost
immediately to the ambush site. Divert
status - here the aircraft are flying
other missions but can be diverted to
the ambush site if needed. One of the
problems that arises is ordnance load-
ing. The possibility of arming aircraft
with antipersonnel ordnance when there
is a chance of their being diverted should
be considered.
In order that the available resources can be used in
the proper area the relative effectiveness of the units must
be evaluated. Four criteria that can be used are firepower,
vulnerability, responsiveness and availability. [12] (See
Table III) It is implied that the units are commensurable.
It must be determined for instance that one tank is equiv-
alent to some number of infantry, artillery or aircraft.
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TABLE III
Relative ranking matrix for force/mode
of employment combinations












































Escort 2 / 3 1 5 4
FIREPOWERStatic 1 / 2 / 4 3
Reaction 3 2 4 1 6 5
Patrol 2 / 1 / 4 3
4 Escort 3 / 2 1 5 4
INVULNERABILITY.3 Static 2 / 1 / 4 3
1 Reaction 4 1 3 2 6 5
2 Patrol 2 / 1 / 4 3
1 Escort 1 /
|
5 4 3 2
j
RESPONSIVENESS3 Static 2 / 1 / 4 3
2 Reaction 4 1 3 2 6 5




Escort 1 / 4 5 3 2
AVAILABILITYStatic 1 / 4 / 3 2
Reaction 1 4 5 6 3 2
Patrol 1 / 4 / 3 2
* A fixed size force has the same firepower regardless
of the mode of employment. The type rankings change
because some resource/mode combinations are not
applicable
.
** For example, if a platoon of infantry is available for
route security duty it can be used in any mode.
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Table III is only an example of how the units could
be ranked. It is possible that in some countries the
police will be more responsive than the military or that
air will be more available than armor. The rankings shown
here are somewhat arbitrary but in actual practice more
precise rankings could be made based on operational ex-
perience. With this type of information a decision maker
can evaluate alternatives. For example, although air pro-
vides great amounts of firepower in the escort mode, its
responsiveness and availability are less than infantry.
The real value in filling out such a table is that it
provides a means whereby planners can consider in detail
the performance of the resources available.
With the variety of useable resources and their
possible modes of employment the tools available for the
route security operation are many. However, consideration






In order that the security forces can be properly
allocated the tasks which they may be required to perform
must be defined. In the event the moving element is
attacked or stopped for some reason, it should have the








These five tasks can be accomplished in a variety of ways
and for clarity will be separately defined,
A. REPEL
The ability to repel an attack is the ability to with-
stand the initial fire of an attacker and to provide a
sufficient amount of return fire to prevent being overrun
for a given amount of time, Armored vehicles may be cap-
able of withstanding intensive enemy small arms fire and
without further action have the capability to repel for
limited amounts of time. This time period is lengthened
when their own firepower is brought to bear on the attacker
Escorting infantry troops give a moving element a capabil-
ity to repel for a length of time determined in part by
the relative strengths of the opposing forces. Anti-
personnel devices mounted on the sides of vehicles give
the moving element a means of repelling an attack for short
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periods. Armed helicopters in the escort mode could also
provide the moving element with the capability to repel an
attack.
B. COUNTERATTACK
The ability to counterattack is the ability to take
offensive action against an attacker so as to relieve the
pressure brought to bear on the moving element. Infantry
units in either the reaction or escort mode can accomplish
this task. All reaction forces can provide a counterattack
capability but the reaction time required will depend to a
large degree upon the moving elements' capability to repel.
For instance, a moving element with a large heavily armed
escort could hold off the attacker and possibly mount a
counterattack without calling upon a reaction force. Con-
versely, the reaction time required to effectively support
a lightly escorted moving element is short and the size of
the force would depend in part upon the strength of the
attacker.
C. PURSUE
The ability to pursue is the ability to continue the
attack against the enemy until he is well clear of the
moving element or until he can be destroyed. This will
probably require larger forces than would conceivably be
escorting a moving element. Almost all reaction forces
can provide this capability to some degree. Pursuit is im-
portant if the route security forces are to prevent the
o
See Chapter VI for a quantitative examination of
this trade off.
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attackers from returning time and time again. This is a
tedious task in the countennsurgency environment but is
extremely important Much time and effort is spent in
counter insurgency operations looking for the enemy. Once
a convoy has been attacked the enemy has been located and
should be destroyed if at all possible. The ability to
pursue rapidly may contribute a great deal to route
security in the long run
D. PROCEED
The ability to proceed is the ability of the moving
element to move its load to the prescribed destination in
the allotted time If the moving element is attacked and
stopped the proceed task can be accomplished by recovery,
replacement or rerouting. The building of a bypass when a
bridge has been blown is an example of recovery while
transferring goods from destroyed vehicles to previously
empty ones is an example of replacement . Rerouting would
be the use of an alternate route. Moving elements with
high priority cargoes will probably require that increased
attention be paid to the proceed task c It may be necessary
to have engineer units accompany a moving element so that






In addition to the previously defined capabilities the
security forces should attempt to prevent attack if possible
Aggressive patrolling may discourage the insurgent from
attacking moving elements due to the high risk of capture
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or death that he takes when moving through areas that are
well patrolled. If it is apparent to the insurgent that
attacking a moving element will bring on a rapid and strong
reaction by his opponent he may look for less costly ob-
jectives. This has its hazards also and may be an example
of not seeing the big picture on the part of the route
security forces. The problem at hand however, is how to
provide security for the moving elements. Artillery fires
which cover likely avenues of approach and forces deployed
in the static mode on bridge defense missions are also ex-
amples of forces which may be used for the prevention task.
Figures 11, 13 and 14 show the resource/mode of
employment combinations that are available for accomplish-
ment of the various tasks. Also shown are preferred
combinations for task accomplishment. Information on red,
yellow and green areas is given in separate figures and
each will be discussed separately.
F. DISCUSSION OF SECURITY FORCES IN RED AREAS
A heavy employment of close combat resources in the
escort mode is indicated for the accomplishment of the
repel and counterattack tasks. An additional benefit of a
heavy infantry-armor escort force is the effect it may have
on the attacker. Paramilitary forces will probably be
used only in the static mode for guarding bridges and other
vulnerable points in the road network. Military police
units if available can be used to direct traffic in vil-
lages or help in the control of two way traffic. Artillery
in the reaction mode provides the moving element with rapid
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fire support on short notice. Artillery can also be used
for the accomplishment of the prevent task by providing
fires on likely approach routes and ambush points. Pre-
planned defensive fires can be used for bridge defense
and thereby make the route less vulnerable to interdiction
by the insurgent.
A medium employment of infantry in the reaction mode
is indicated for the accomplishment of the pursue task.
Normally the high enemy threat will preclude the use of the
escort forces for pursuit and reaction forces must be
relied upon.
Armed helicopters can be used in the escort mode if
available and provide a rapid firepower capability for the
accomplishment of the counterattack task. For the pursue
task the ground alert status can be used since the reaction
time will probably be short due to the relatively short
distances between destinations in the red areas. Fixed
wing aircraft will probably not be used in the escort mode
because of availability and the fact that their high speed
provides an extremely short reaction time.
Because of the importance of keeping the convoys mov-
ing, the likelihood of poor roads and the high probability
of enemy interdiction it appears that engineers should be
employed in the escort mode. If employed in the reaction
mode the time delay that may result could be disastrous to
the moving element.
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Weather can have serious effects in the red areas
Low ceilings may make it impossible to use aircraft and
rain could make travel by motor transport extremely dif-
ficult.
The convoys in red areas will most likely be relatively
large with a high concentration of available resources in
the escort mode so that any likely attack can be repulsed
and the convoy kept moving. There are several ways in
which the escort forces can be positioned in the convoy
but it would seem that a method such as shown in Figure 12







Possible Position of Armed Vehicles
in a Convoy
In areas where a high threat of ambush by large forces
exists it is important that the security forces be spread
out so that the cargo vehicles cannot be isolated and
destroyed. If the security forces are spread out it is
unlikely that large numbers of them will be in the killing
zone at any given time and therefore are more readily
available to mount a counterattack
„
De 1 tchman , loccit
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Generally, it appears that in the red areas an effec-
tive mode of employment for the security force would be a
heavy force in the escort mode with a supplemental reaction
force. This supplemental reaction force should be provided
with a rapid means of transport such as helicopters if they
are available.
G. DISCUSSION OF SECURITY FORCES IN YELLOW AREAS
A medium employment of available close combat resources
is indicated for the accomplishment of the repel and counter-
attack tasks due to a lower level enemy threat. Due to the
probable higher frequency of movement in yellow areas and
a reduced escorting force the reaction forces will have to
be relatively large. Available artillery can be used in
the same way as it is used in the red areas and preplanned
concentrations will reduce the reaction time for effective
artillery fires.
Military police units may be of some value as escorts
in the yellow areas if they have heavy infantry weapons
such as machine guns. Local police and paramilitary units
can be used, for the accomplishment of the prevent task in
either the static or the patrol mode. Some installations,
such as bridges may require a static security force but
units employed in the patrol mode can probably be equally
effective in some areas and cover a much larger sector.
Armed helicopters may be used in the escort mode but
probably only when intelligence reports indicate a higher
than normal risk to movement. Detachments at various
points in a ground alert status can provide a rapid reaction
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force for ambushed convoys and the total number of helicop-
ters required would be less than the number required to
escort all moving elements.
Fixed wing air forces may be employed in a divert
status as well as in a ground alert status and consideration
should be given to the feasibility of arming aircraft, that
are subject to being diverted, for antipersonnel missions.
With a large number of convoys on the move it will
probably not be feasible to provide engineers to escort all
convoys. Therefore, they will most likely be employed in
a reaction or static mode. There should be some engineers
that are available and capable of being helilifted to
trouble spots so as to reduce the delay time of moving
elements. However, most of the engineer support will
probably be moved by motor transport.
Generally, it appears that in the yellow areas the
primary mode of employment for security forces will be
the reaction mode with a sufficient escort force to repel
and counterattack the expected size ambushing force. A
relatively large reaction force is required to provide the
necessary forces in the event of attack by enemy units
larger than normally anticipated.
H. DISCUSSION OF SECURITY FORCES IN GREEN AREAS
In the green areas the primary threat is one of small
incidents such as snipers, mines or grenades. Infantry and
paramilitary forces will probably be used in the escort
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The primary security forces in green areas will prob-
ably be police forces, either civil or military. These
can be employed in all modes but the escort mode will most
likely be the least used. One of the main functions of
police units will be to insure an orderly flow of traffic
in green areas so that moving elements are not stopped for
long periods of time. This is an invitation for attack
and stoppages should be minimized.
Individual drivers should be armed and perhaps an
armed assistant driver could be provided. This will normal-
ly be sufficient to repel the type attack anticipated in
green areas. Some engineer capability must be provided
for but considering the high likelihood of alternate routes
the engineer tasks could presumably be handled in a routine
nature by engineer units statically employed in the local
area.
I. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control in the counterinsurgency environ-
ment may be more difficult than in normal operations due to
indigenous governmental control of such things as air
strikes and artillery missions. The command and control
aspects of a route security operation are extremely impor-
tant and it seeme unlikely that a flexible and responsive
security system can be built without an effective system
of command and control.
Present policy dictates that control of the means of
transportation should be exercised at the highest level
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which can maintain effective control But, since
security forces may be provided by completely separate
commands an immediate coordination problem arises.
Tactical movements will probably be the easiest to
control because the transportation units are usually
organic to and subordinate to the tactical commander. In
logistic moves by logistic commands with combat arms pro-
viding the security forces the command and control structure
will probably be more cumbersome. Cooperation is appealing
in concept but rarely provides the response and effective-
ness that a task organized force under a single commander
can elicit
It appears that more effective command and control
could be achieved on logistic moves by using a task
organization similar to those used for tactical moves, A
more effective system would probably result from giving
the commander of the escorting combat forces the authority
to control all the resources alloted to the task. The
senior officer from the transportation command could then
be designated as the assistant commander with the respon-
sibility of controlling the technical aspects of the move-
ment. Only on green roads where special security forces
are not normally provided would the transportation officer
have complete control of the moving element.
An effective command and control system would probably
be one which is centrally commanded at the highest possible
10




the Landing Force ^ iMCEC, Ouantico, Virginia: 1960), p. 30.
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level with the various movement elements task organized and
equipped for decentralized direction once the resource
allocations have been made.
It is desirable that communication networks be estab-
lished so as to provide a rapid response by all reaction
forces to include ground, air and engineer units. If
intelligence is to have any value to route security forces
some method of rapid dissemination should be devised. A
system of intervehicular communications is required to
insure a rapid response by escort forces to changing
situations
.
Whatever system of command and control is chosen its
effectiveness will be enhanced if it is continually tested.
By having practice alerts the involved personnel are pro-
vided an opportunity to test the system and to identify
weak points. It may seem expensive in terms of time and
effort to run practice alerts but the consequences of a
failure in an actual situation may prove disastrous. A
"five minute" alert force that is only a five minute alert
force ten percent of the time cannot be relied upon to a
very high degree. Good information on the true readiness
and training levels of reaction forces could be the dif-
ference between success in route security and failure to
accomplish the mission.
The effectiveness of the various route security forces
is difficult to measure because of the difficulty in pre-
dicting the enemy intentions. In some areas unarmed con-
voys may pass without harassment because the enemy feels
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it is more advantageous to allow this passage than to
suffer the subsequent retaliation In this instance
security torces ot any major size represent an overkill
and although seemingly effective because the convoys are
not attacked, a squad could possibly achieve the same re-
sults o
In general it appears that in the red areas escort
forces will predominate supplemented by reaction forces.
In the yellow areas a lesser use will be made of the escort
mode and a greater reliance placed on reaction forces. In
the green areas the security will probably be provided
primarily by police type units employed for the most part
in the static or patrol mode
62
CHAPTER VI
A SIMPLIFIED EFFECTIVENESS MODEL FOR
ESCORT AND REACTION FORCES
This chapter represents a first approximation for the
problem of comparing the effectiveness of escort and
reaction forces in performing route security missions. A
form of Lanchester's equations is used to determine the
length of engagement for an ambush by a fixed size insurgent
force on an escorted convoy. A computer program was written
which computes these engagement times for various size
escorts, rates of fire and weapons effectiveness. The
program also computes the maximum distance from an ambush
site that heliborne and truckborne forces can be positioned
in order to provide support to an ambushed convoy.
Route security planners must make decisions on the size
of the escort which will be provided for convoys moving in
different areas. Available resources are assumed to include
a limited number of infantry troops and some number of
helicopters and trucks which can be used to transport
reaction forces. The decision on whether to use helicopters
or trucks will depend in part upon the distance from the
ambush site and the required reaction time.
A. SCENARIO
In the scenario which is examined it is assumed that
all personnel are armed with rifles and that no artillery
or armor is available. The only aircraft available are
See the Appendix for two versions of the program.
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those helicopters which are used to transport reaction
forces. A single convoy is proceeding along a route and
is ambushed by a fixed size insurgent force . It is assumed
that escort forces which accompany the convoy have limited
cover available and that the attacking insurgents are
hidden from view throughout the engagement The friendly
force can stay and fight or be reinforced by reaction forces.
The insurgent can either stay and fight or break contact
and flee.
B. THE LANCHESTER MODEL
S. J. Deitchman in his article "A Lanchester Model of
Guerrilla Warfare" provided a variation of Lanchester 's
equations which can be applied to guerrilla warfare. [4]
This model is a mixture of Lanchester' s square and linear
laws. The ambushing guerrilla fires on the convoy escort
using point fire but the convoy escort is forced to use
area fire because they cannot see the hidden attackers ,
Thus, the escort's loss rate will be proportional to the
number of guerrillas which are firing whereas the guerrillas
loss rate will be proportional to the number of escort troops
firing and the number of guerrillas in the area into which
the escort is firing. The equations which are used for
this type of exchange are shown below. All notation used
is the same as that used in the computer program.
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G = -A Fo Go (VI. 1)
F = -B Go. (VI. 2)
Here G = Rate at which guerrillas are killed,
F = Rate at which the escort forces are killed,
Fo = Initial size of the friendly escort force,
Go = Initial size of the guerrilla force,
A = (RF) (AEFD/AGT Attrition coefficient,
RD = Friendly rate of fire
AEFl = Single shot area of effectiveness
for friendly fire,
AGT = (AG1) (Go) = Total area the guerrilla
force occupies . (AG1 is the area
occupied by one guerrilla.)
B = (RG) (PG1) = Attrition coefficient,
RG = Guerrilla rate of fire,
And PG1 = Single shot kill probability for
guerrilla fire.
The condition for equality .is ishown to be
Go = (A/2B) Fo . (VI. 3)
C. THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE EQUATIONS
The following equations were shown by Deitchman and are
iincluded for the interested reader. For the case where
2
Go > (A/2B) Fo the guerrilla wins with Gf . -, = C, and
I 2G C-[l +UFo-K
1
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,
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D. REACTION FORCE EFFECTIVENESS
For purposes of this analysis it is assumed that in
order for the reaction forces to be effective they must
arrive before the predicted completion of the battle. If
the initial escort size is such i that the guerrilla might be
expected to win the engagement then the arrival of reaction
forces can prevent the annihilation of the escort and change
the course of .the battle. If the escort size is such that
the escort would be expected to win then the arrival of
reaction forces can reduce casualties. Also, if the guer-
rilla breaks contact, the reaction forces can pursue him
almost immediately.
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Reaction times are greatly increased by long load times
and communications delays. If reaction forces are to be
relied upon to defeat ambushes it appears that this "dead"
time must be reduced in every way possible.
E. AN EXAMPLE OF REACTION FORCES
AND AN ESCORT OF VARIOUS SIZES
FOR A FIXED GUERRILLA FORCE.
In this example the following data has been used.
Go = 80
RF = 20 rounds per minute
RG = 20 rounds per minute
AEF1 = 1.5 sq. ft.
PF1 = .01
AG1 = 100 sq. ft.
Helo speed = 90 mph
Truck speed = 30 mph
Load Time and Communications Delays = 5 minutes
The size of the insurgent force (Go) was chosen because
it seems to be representative of what might be expected in
a convoy ambush. Smaller and larger size units can be
used in the analysis if desired. The rates of fire (RF, RG)
may be low for such weapons as the M-16 but twenty rounds
per minute was used because this represents sustained fire
by all personnel in the escort force. Single round area of
effectiveness for friendly fire (AEFl) represents the target
area actually occupied by one insurgent. The possible area
of 100 sq. ft. which one insurgent may occupy (AG1) represents
a ten by ten foot square in which the insurgent may be
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located. The single shot kill probability for guerrilla
fire (PG1) seems reasonable for the situation considered.
The helicopter and truck speeds are representative of con-
temporary equipment. The aforementioned data was used
in the computer program and the results are shown in the
sample output which is included in the Appendix.
In Figure 15 the battle time for various size escorts
and an eighty man insurgent force has been plotted. The
percentage of the escort force which survives has also been
plotted and it can be seen that in the area where the
guerrilla is expected to win the percentage of the escort
which survives is zero. The escort of size ninety-two
represents the point at which equality occurs and has been
labeled as the BREAK EVEN point. The computed battle time
at this point approaches infinity but can be assumed to
have some finite upper limit which is probably in the
neighborhood of one hour.
When the size of the escort is less than the break-even
size it can be seen that the battle time drops off rapidly.
It should be remembered that the times which are plotted
are for the total destruction of the escort. For escort
sizes above the break-even size the battle times again drop
off but the result for these engagements is that the guer-
rilla is defeated Friendly casualties and survivors are
also shown in Figure 15,
in Figure 16 the distances from which heliborne and
truckborne reaction forces, using a five minute departure
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delay time, can operate have been plotted. These distances
are based on the premise that reaction forces are of value
only if they arrive before the battle is over.
The break-even escort size1 for a given size of guerrilla
force, will probably be fairly well known in actual opera-
tions and it is unlikely that convoys would be moved with
escorts much smaller than this break-even size. The
guerrilla will probably not attack convoys which are escort-
ed by forces of a size that can be expected to win in a
short time. Consequently, large escorts may deter attacks
or force the guerrilla to increase the size of units he
uses for convoy ambushes. The counterinsurgent will not,
in all probability, always have enough forces available to
provide escorts large enough to deter the guerrilla from
i
attacking.
In those areas where escort size must be at or below
j
the break-even point the counterinsurgent may be forced
i
to have reaction forces in airborne helicopters in order to
meet the time requirements for effective reaction. Required
reaction times are also reduced for large escorts because
it can be expected that the insurgent will break contact
if he sees he is losing, and he cannot be effectively
i
pursued if reaction forces arrive too late.
In general, one can say that the battle time will fall
off rapidly on either side of the break-even point and
consequently the distances at which reaction forces can
be positioned will also be decreased.
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F. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the data used in che example may not corres-
pond exactly to present operational data the torm or the
results do compare favorably with intuition. The model
could possibly be enhanced by using some additional tech-
i
niques. Perhaps the Lanchester model as presented could
be used for the first few minutes ot an engagement and then
the square law could be applied to both sides. This would
simulate the escort force taking cover . Another approach
which might be useful would be to collect available
empirical data on convoy ambushes and use the data for a
computer simulation. The effects of artillery and other
support weapons could then also be examined. Convoy size
has not been considered here and this would certainly have
i
some effect on the ability of the insurgent to take
security forces under fire and the ability or the security
forces to return fire. In red areas where convoys will
probably be large, but few in number, the escort should be
of a size well above the break-eyen point. This would pro-
vide some deterrent and give the convoy commander much more
flexibility in the employment of j his security forces. In
yellow areas it can be expected that the traffic density
will be greater and the convoys will be smaller than those
m the red areas. The escorts in yellow areas will prob-
ably be smaller but should be at 1 least as big as the
break-even size if possible. Reaction forces can prob-
ably be designated to support more than one convoy due
to the reduced expected frequency of attack by the
72
insurgent. This will tend to reduce the resource cost of
a single convoy somewhat in comparison with a convoy of
similar size moving in a red area.
The primary points that seem to stand out in this
analysis are that if reaction forces are to be used they
must be rapid and that the size of the escort must be at
least as great as the break-even size if favorable results




With the ever-increasing numbers of helicopters appear-
ing on the modern battlefield it is possible that movement
by truck in a hostile environment will someday become a
thing of the past That day , however, is still far away
and therefore anything which can be done to make truck
movements more successful should at least be of value in
the foreseeable future
Military operations of almost all types have been
studied in some detail but route security operations seem
to have been somewhat neglected Anti-ambush techniques
are taught in most ground-oriented military courses but the
overall view of route security and the inherent problems
have apparently escaped the detailed analysis given to other
types of operations. Perhaps in the future more detailed
analysis of past route security operations will be made
which may lead to the adoption of better route security
methods m the years to come.
Rainstorms
,
blown bridges or a change in emphasis by
the insurgent can rapidly alter the forces required to pro-
vide security m a particular area. Planners of route
security operations should consider, to whatever extent is
feasible, the effects of weather, the routes traversed and
the enemy capabilities and intentions so that they can build
a flexible and responsive system. The route security pro-
blem is dynamic in nature and continual examination should
be made of the constantly changing environment.
7 4
The possible ways in which convoys can be structured
with regard to size and composition, the reasons for move-
ment and the relative resource costs should be considered
by both combat and logistic unit commanders. Expected
reaction time for reaction forces which use different types
of transport should be computed and the forces positioned
so that their capabilities can be efficiently utilized. If
the security resources are limited, which is usually the
case, then it is even more important that they are used
efficiently.
It appears that escort forces must be of a size which
enables them to at least hold their own with any anticipated
attacking force so that reaction forces have a reasonable
amount of time in which to respond. When reaction forces
are used they must have a means of high-speed transport or
they will probably arrive too late to be of any value to
the attacked convoy.
Drills should be conducted whenever possible for all
route security forces so that when the need arises for
their services, commanders will have reliable information
on their expected effectiveness. These drills also give
security forces a chance to iron out difficulties before
they are required to perform.
With respect to future study several things come to
mind which may be worthy of consideration.
Some form of manual war game could possibly be developed
which would allow interested persons to observe the effects
of route security decisions on mission accomplishment.
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Experimentation by military units using dirferent size con-
voys, security forces and aggressor units could provide
valuable information for future use Historical research of
past encounters could probably provide additional data. Once
some good empirical data is available a computer simulation
could be used to study the effects of changes in the pre-
dominant elements of the problem. Chapter VI is a first
step in this direction A study to acquire more factual
data would enhance use of models of this kind as -would their
i
modification to include the use of aircraft and artillery in
route security.
If the enemy order of battle m a given area could be
quantified and the disposition to attack described in some
way then one could forecast the expected firepower threat
to a moving element, From this one could predict, with some
level of confidence, the security forces which would be
required to provide an advantageous firepower position over
the attacker and insure that the convoy would reach its
destination
Interesting work could also be done m the realm of
cost-effectiveness studies for the various resource-mode of
employment combinations If, tor example, the helicopter
proved to be a cost-effective means for transporting escort
troops it could influence the types and numbers of heli-
copters which are purchased in the future
The surface has been scratched and some of the promin-
ent elements of the route security problem have been iden-
tified. Several of the relationships have been examined,
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but this is only a beginning. It is hoped that those who
read this paper will share the author's enthusiasm and
undertake the task of going another step forward so that
ultimately the forces in the field can be provided with
the best possible route security.
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included to explain the programs. All variable names are
six letters or less and it should not be difficult to change
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